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Advocacy in the Era of the Vanishing Trial 
Robert P. Burns 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The vanishing trial is part of our legal landscape.  Lawyers, who are 
clear-eyed people little given to romantic sentimentality, will inevitably 
accommodate their lawyering styles to this phenomenon, even if they are 
unhappy with this course of events.  It has often been remarked ruefully 
that “trial lawyers” have almost all become “litigators.”  I have been 
teaching trial skills to practicing lawyers through the National Institute 
for Trial Advocacy (NITA) for thirty years, and those same skills to law 
students for about the same time.  I am definitely ambivalent about a 
change in the way in which our continuing legal education (CLE) 
organizations and law schools imagine the legal process when that 
change hastens the death of the trial.1  After all, one of the identified 
causes for the death of the trial—an institution which is, in my view, a 
significant cultural achievement—is the sharp decline in trial skills 
among bar members and the resulting aversion to bringing cases to trial.  
If lawyers increasingly view trials as deviant events, their approach to 
litigating cases will itself become one of the causes of the trial’s 
disappearance.  The “new normal” will become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, operating through our collective professional psychology and, 
derivatively, through the economics of actually getting a case to trial. 
What is the “vanishing trial” phenomenon?  I have summarized it in the 
following terms: 
Marc Galanter and Angela Frozena have recently updated previous 
work to bring the data up to 2009.  With regard to civil trials in the 
federal courts, they conclude that there is “no news” and “big news.”  
The “no news” is that the half-century downward trend lines continue.  
The “big news” is “that the civil trial [in the federal courts] is 
approaching extinction.”  Here is a very brief summary of the most 
illuminating statistics from both Galanter’s earlier and more recent 
                                                          
           Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. 
 1.  See, e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009). 
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work.  In 1938, about 20% of federal civil cases went to trial.  By 1962, 
the percentage was down to 12%.  By 2009, the number sunk to 1.7%.  
The percentage of jury trials in federal civil cases was down to just 
under 1%, and the percentage of bench trials was even lower.  So 
between 1938 and 2009, there was a decline in the percentage of civil 
cases going to trial of over 90% and the pace of the decline was 
accelerating toward the end of that period until very recently, when 
there was almost literally no further decline possible. . . .  One more 
localized study of six federal district courts found that in 1975, twice as 
many civil cases were resolved after trial than by summary judgment; 
by 2000, in the same districts three times as many cases were resolved 
by summary judgment than by trial.  So in those districts the rate of 
cases “disposed of,” to use a telling metaphor, by summary judgment 
rose 350%.2 
I am, for the reasons given below, reluctant at this stage to concede 
defeat and to reimagine the way lawyers should conceive of a lawsuit.  
Given the low percentage of civil cases that go to trial—less than two 
percent in the federal system—I would not blame anyone for 
surrendering to an “inevitable” result that we collectively continue to 
create. 
In this essay, I will do three things.  First, I will offer reasons why 
even good litigators must continue to understand the trial—an 
understanding that can come only from studying and participating in it.  
Second, I will offer a few suggestions about how we are likely to litigate 
differently in the era of the just-about-vanished trial.  Third, I will argue 
that these changes are not likely to create a more just legal order.  
Although an individual lawyer must proceed in the manner that is in his 
client’s interest, lawyers, as stewards of our legal order, should seek 
collectively to maintain the trial as an important element of that order. 
First, for the foreseeable future, it will be important for litigators to 
have some imagination for the structure and experience of the trial.  
Effective deposition practice, for example, requires an understanding of 
necessary foundations for personal knowledge,3 authentication,4 the 
sometimes elusive definition of hearsay,5 and the hearsay exceptions.6  
Some experience of evidence law as it actually functions at trial is 
                                                          
 2.  Robert P. Burns, What Will We Lose if the Trial Vanishes?, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575, 
576–77 (2011) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 3.  See FED. R. EVID. 602. 
 4.  See id. 901–902. 
 5.  See id. 801(a)–(d). 
 6.  See id. 803–804, 807. 
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important for conducting a deposition effectively on those issues.  After 
all, summary judgment motions have to be supported by admissible 
evidence,7 or at least the reliable promise of admissible evidence.8  
Without the experience of successfully laying the necessary foundations 
for important categories of evidence at trial, it is hard to believe that a 
lawyer could move directly from the statement of the rule to the 
necessary questions at a deposition.  Certainly, the usual law school 
approach to evidence law through the study of appellate cases would be 
of very limited value.  Because the profession will be unlikely to change 
the culture of American law schools’ teaching methods anytime over the 
next ten years9 (beyond that I am unsure), we cannot count on law 
schools contributing much to this enterprise. 
More broadly, it is still true that the entire structure of civil 
procedure has been built up as a path to an adversary trial, with its 
combination of narrative and argumentative elements.  It is hard to 
understand much of civil practice—how to conduct an interview, identify 
important documents, or conduct depositions—without understanding 
the trial.  Especially for us Americans, who have very little experience in 
our ordinary lives of good storytelling, the centrality of narrative to the 
trial and, derivatively, to all of legal procedure, is necessarily something 
that is learned.  As with evidence law, learning civil practice abstractly is 
nothing like learning it from the inside.  One of our greatest (adopted) 
political philosophers put it this way: “No philosophy, no analysis, no 
aphorism, be it ever so profound, can compare in intensity and richness 
of meaning with a properly narrated story.”10 
And so I have always thought that it makes more sense for a law 
student or a young lawyer to take a trial practice course or CLE seminar 
first, and only then a deposition course or seminar.  Trying cases 
provides an imagination for what is a compelling story and what 
elements it contains.  That imagination allows for effective pretrial and 
even appellate practice.  A basic principle of effective advocacy is “facts 
                                                          
 7.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a 
motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and 
show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”). 
 8.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (“We do not mean that the 
nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid 
summary judgment.”). 
 9.  Michael Polanyi noted that no significant scientific breakthrough has ever convinced the 
guardians of the status quo.  Rather, each successful step forward has simply managed to hold its 
ground until the once dominant scientists have died off. 
 10.  HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 22 (1955). 
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persuade; conclusions don’t.”  That principle holds true at all levels, but 
one can understand it more deeply if one has had some experience in the 
trial courtroom. 
In particular, we commonly assume that we “know” things when we 
actually lack “personal knowledge” within the meaning of Rule 602 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Trial lawyers would know this 
distinction well.  The latter, in effect, requires perceptual knowledge and, 
in practice, requires that testimony be in the “language of perception.”  
The latter excludes hearsay evidence and much lay witness opinion 
testimony.  It is probably true that many of the great figures in the history 
of Anglo-American evidence law were partly in the thrall of the then-
dominant variants of philosophical empiricism, which saw such 
perceptions as purely given, hard foundations out of which secure 
knowledge could be constructed.  We have since seen effective assaults 
on “the myth of the given” and the ascent of the notion that perceptions 
are to some extent “theory-laden.”  For practical purposes, however, the 
notion that perceptions are more likely to be reliable than our usual 
inventory of opinions and prejudices is unassailable.  Much of what goes 
on in the trial court involves challenging the reliability of evidence that is 
good enough to be admissible but whose weight is subject to serious 
question.  The dozen or so modes of impeachment—which almost 
always provide commonplaces, as the old rhetoricians liked to say, from 
which to draw arguments that suggest the limitations on the probative 
value of testimony and other evidence—illustrate this principle.  I think it 
will remain true that lawyers who have a sense of the disciplined and 
rigorous way the trial court treats claims of individual knowledge are 
likely to be better lawyers at all levels of litigation. 
II.  SOME LIKELY CHANGES IN LAWYERING METHODS BECAUSE OF THE 
VANISHING TRIAL 
There may come a time—and it may already be happening—that the 
way in which we conduct civil litigation changes because of the 
vanishing trial.  There is some evidence—studies are ongoing11—that 
                                                          
 11.  See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 21–23 (Mar. 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motion 
iqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf (finding rates of filing of defendants’ motions to dismiss have 
generally increased, but the rates of dispositive rulings dismissing cases have not increased).  But see 
Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on 
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2274–75 (2012) (noting the effects of the two cases have 
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Iqbal12 and Twombly13 have led a significant number of district court 
judges to dismiss more cases as pleading “implausible” claims.  That 
trend would probably lead defense counsel to devote more resources to 
those motions, just as the “Summary Judgment Trilogy” seemed to have 
some effect on summary judgment practice some time ago.  These sorts 
of cases at the Supreme Court level signal a change of mood that 
indicates a greater receptivity to summary disposition.  It is that change 
of mood, rather than the narrow holding of the cases or rearticulation of 
standards, that is likely to have concrete effects in the lower courts. 
For practicing lawyers, habitual patterns of litigation that have 
proven successful will continue to have an important influence.  We will 
probably realize only after the fact that we have adapted to a new 
procedural regime.  For example, deposition practice may be changing.  I 
have for quite some number of years been the Program Director for the 
Midwest Regional Deposition practice program for NITA.  We have 
traditionally taught deposition practice with two overarching goals: (1) 
exhaustive discovery on those points that prior legal and factual analysis 
indicates are important; and (2) the creation of a clear and unambiguous 
transcript that can be used to control witnesses at trial or in lieu of 
testimony at trial with some witnesses, and only secondarily in support of 
summary judgment motions.  My suspicion is that deposition practice 
may be somewhat reconceived, with achieving and resisting summary 
judgment and with settling cases more at its core. 
Without identifying all the ways in which this could occur, let me 
note several.  It seems that the traditional advice offered to clients in 
witness preparation—to give the most limited possible fair answer to 
questions—should be rethought.  The traditional notion was that any 
testimony the witness gives at deposition could only be used against him 
at trial: there was everything to lose by fully describing the case and 
really nothing to gain.  However, if an increasingly important function of 
the deposition is to convince opposing counsel of the strength of one’s 
case for settlement purposes, there is every reason for a witness to put 
all, or at least more, of his cards on the table at the deposition—even if 
such testimony is volunteered, that is, not directly responsive to a 
narrowly construed question. 
                                                                                                                       
been much greater than the rates of grants of motions to dismiss would suggest). 
 12.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 13.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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The increasing incidence of summary judgment may have a further 
effect on witness preparation.  It may become harder and harder to 
supplement limited answers at depositions with supplemental (sometimes 
called “sham”) affidavits that substantially change the import of a 
witness’s testimony.14  It may become more important that a witness’s 
deposition testimony be complete because counter-affidavits may not be 
effective at the summary judgment stage, and there will be no 
opportunity to tell a fuller story at trial.15 
Additionally, depositions may focus more on the sort of adverse 
examination that creates a transcript in support of a summary judgment 
motion aimed narrowly on a single element of the plaintiff’s claim, rather 
than a broader “information gathering” strategy aimed at learning about a 
larger range of facts that the examining lawyer realizes may be beyond 
what he already suspects to be true.  The deposition will focus on 
confirming in unambiguous language what that lawyer already believes 
to be true.  After all, the vanishing trial phenomenon will reduce the 
likelihood of being surprised by an important detail that the attorney 
failed to discover.16 
I can imagine critics of American civil justice applauding the latter 
development.  It could, after all, focus the lawyer on the “jugular issue” 
defined by the legal rules and reduce the amount of unnecessary 
discovery.  I will discuss that consideration below.  But in another way, 
the vanishing trial phenomenon, by depriving American lawyers of an 
imagination for what is persuasive at trial and the importance of a single 
powerful “factual theory and theme,” is likely to increase the incidence 
of discovery for its own sake, on matters peripheral to the examining 
lawyer’s theory and theme.  The river of pretrial procedure can lose its 
banks and become a broad delta little related to “what this case is about,” 
as trial lawyers have traditionally put it in opening statements.  That kind 
of unnecessary discovery may increase the costs of litigation generally 
and serve as an additional reason why clients are unwilling to support 
bringing cases to trial. 
                                                          
 14.  EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 244–56 (3rd ed. 2006). 
 15.  It has, in the past, been possible to conduct “impeachment by omission” on a point omitted 
from deposition testimony and included at trial, but this form of impeachment is relatively difficult 
to do effectively and requires an expertly created deposition transcript. 
 16.  We will see shortly that this development has some significant, and in my view negative, 
consequences for the quality of civil justice. 
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III. IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 
I want to spend most of my time here arguing that the American trial 
has characteristics, many of them so obvious that we can forget them, 
that cannot be replaced by other procedures.  As Dr. Samuel Johnson 
said, it is generally more important that men be reminded than 
informed.17 
The face-to-face trial—especially the jury trial—has characteristics 
that no other dispute resolution method has.  James Boyd White referred 
to the face-to-face hearing as the sun around which all the planets in our 
procedural world revolve.  His colleague Thomas Greene, writing in the 
context of the history of English criminal law, argued that the face-to-
face trial, even in the awful form it took in the seventeen and eighteenth 
centuries, kept alive the notion that legal proceedings were somehow 
about justice.  There are, no doubt, significant impersonal forces working 
to reduce the incidence of trials.  Ultimately, appellate courts, trial 
courts, and legislatures will decide whether to take the steps necessary to 
preserve the trial.  I think these institutions remain “places of freedom” 
that are not simply the playthings (“dependent variables” wholly 
controlled by objective “independent variables”) of those impersonal 
social and economic forces.  We may act responsibly and politically in 
those forums to preserve practices and institutions that represent aspects 
of our republican inheritance. 
What, then, are the characteristics of the trial and the forms of 
advocacy appropriate to it?  It is easy to forget the concrete 
characteristics of an American trial.  We should remind ourselves of 
them from time to time.18  The rules of the trial force the conversation 
that takes place there down to the “concrete and specific features of the 
case.”  Recall Sandburg’s account: 
“Do you solemnly swear by the everliving God that the testimony you 
are about to give in this cause shall be the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth?” 
“No, I don’t.  I can tell you what I saw and what I heard and I’ll swear 
to that by the everliving God but the more I study about it the more sure 
I am that nobody but the everliving God knows the whole truth and if 
                                                          
 17.  Samuel Johnson, No. 2, Saturday, March 24, 1749–50, THE RAMBLER, Mar. 24, 1750. 
 18.  For a much fuller inventory see ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 126–41 
(1999). 
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you summoned Christ as a witness in this case what he would tell you 
would burn your insides with the pity and mystery of it.”19 
The paradox that Sandburg’s dialogue illuminates is that, for the 
likes of us, the more we take the concrete facts of the case seriously and 
attend to what witnesses saw and heard, the closer we may get to a real 
understanding of the meaning of the underlying events.  We will, of 
course, never reach the real “God’s-eye” view, but we can, with some 
fear and trembling, approach it if we are willing to criticize the 
stereotypes and prejudices we inevitably bring to trial.  The devices of 
the trial allow for precisely that kind of situated criticism of our received 
views, which may allow the truth of a very specific situation to emerge. 
Second, the dramatic events occur at trial through a temporal 
sequence.  Each exchange has, for a moment, a complete monopoly on 
the immediate attention of judge or jury.  Plato famously referred to 
time—the sequence of “nows”—as the “moving image of eternity.”20  
Each exchange in the trial court may be the privileged lens through 
which the meaning and importance of the events tried can be seen.  The 
temporal sequence in real time allows us to pause over the significance 
of each fact. 
Third, temporal compression in the American jury trial—the entire 
case has to be tried during a relatively short and continuous period—
allows for holistic grasps of the evidence: it allows each part to be seen 
in light of the whole and the whole to be understood in light of the parts.  
As the trial winds down toward its end, it requires each advocate to 
address precisely the arguments made by the opponent that he or she 
perceives as likely to be the most persuasive. 
Fourth, the devices of the trial achieve a psychologically demanding 
postponement of judgment.  The trial is constituted by a rhythm between 
continuous presentation and continuous interruption.  Each full narrative 
in the opening statement is interrupted by a competing narrative.  Direct 
examination is followed by cross-examination.  A case-in-chief is 
interrupted by another, and then by rebuttal evidence.  Continuous 
presentation is necessary because the coherence of a narrative is an 
important aspect of its possible truth.  Interruption is necessary because 
each continuous narrative inevitably leaves something out.21 
                                                          
 19.  CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 193 (1936). 
 20.  PLATO, TIMAEUS 19 (Benjamin Jourett trans., The Liberal Arts Press 1949) (360 B.C.). 
 21.  In American practice, as opposed to British, the judge almost never summarizes the 
evidence, imposing another “official” narrative on the evidence. 
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Fifth, the jury will inevitably be assessing the “truthfulness” of all 
the participants in the trial.  The truthfulness of witnesses will tell the 
jury not only about the likelihood of the accounts they give, but about 
who they are through a form of character evidence that the rules of 
evidence do not exclude.  The lawyers, too, have a kind of truthfulness 
appropriate to their role, though it is of a more public, diplomatic,22 and 
political sort.  The jury will implicitly ask whether their case allows them 
to be fair to the competing norms and considerations that are always in 
play at trial.  The trial itself then becomes a “lens and metaphor” for the 
underlying events being tried. 
In sum, the “[c]haracteristics of the trial, then, force the mind 
downward toward the concrete, intensify the competition over the 
meaning of the events being tried, and cultivate the suspension of 
judgment until all the aspects of the situation are explored.”23  The aural 
medium of the trial allows us to “become” each other person in the trial 
drama, but at a distance beyond touching distance, so that we have the 
conditions for justice: sympathy and detachment.24  And dramatic 
performance can mediate between public norms and the “particular 
details of the individual case.”25  As the late Milner Ball put it: “Live 
presentation . . . may give more urgent reality to the particular acts that 
establish distance between a given case and general rule or that expose a 
given case to competing rules.”26  The dramatic tensions within the trial 
function positively to reveal, in ways that are only partially articulated, 
what is at issue in the case: “At its best, the presentation of a case is a 
coincidence of reality and illusion, not in the sense of perjury, but in the 
sense of theatrical metaphor—the reenactment of relevant and material 
elements for reflection and judgment.”27  As Eric Bentley—an important 
theorist of drama—put it, “The little ritual of performance, given just a 
modicum of competence, can lend to the events represented another 
dimension, a more urgent reality.”28  A trial lawyer is the producer and 
director of, and an actor in, an extremely demanding and engaging 
drama.  The process requires an understanding of human sensibilities and 
                                                          
 22.  “Trial advocacy” was once called “trial diplomacy,” as the title of a classic trial advocacy 
treatise suggests.  ALAN E. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1974). 
 23.  BURNS, supra note 18, at 132. 
 24.  RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 102–04 (1983). 
 25.  Id. at 137. 
 26.  MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW 61 (1981). 
 27.  Id. at 50. 
 28.  ERIC BENTLEY, THE THEATRE OF COMMITMENT 207 (1967). 
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a craftsman’s care for language.  The loss of those sensibilities is not the 
primary reason to reverse the decline in the trial, but it is collateral 
damage from the wound to our public culture of which trial lawyers may 
be especially aware. 
Think back, for example, to the way in which I have speculated that 
deposition practice may be changing.  The practice would, I believe, be 
more mechanical, more legalistic: more of the effort would go into trying 
to fit the evidence, as shaped by pretrial practice, into or outside of the 
legal categories, with relatively less concern for either the whole story or 
even the factual detail of the underlying events.  More time would be 
spent wrestling with witnesses for verbal concessions dictated by the 
legal rules.  I think it would be more about words, not things. 
It might be suggested that the latter development would enhance the 
rule of law, but this is largely an illusion.  Marc Galanter has made the 
point that this mode of practice does not really enhance the rule of law, 
because multiplying legal issues increases the range of discretionary 
determinations: 
In a realm of ever-proliferating legal doctrine, the opportunities for 
arguments and decisions about the law are multiplied, while arguments 
and decisions become more detached from the texture of facts—at least 
from facts that have weathered the testing of trial.  The general effects 
of judicial activity are derived less from a fabric of examples of 
contested facts and more from an admixture of doctrinal exegesis, 
discretional rulings of trial judges, and the strategic calculations of the 
parties.  Contests of interpretation replace contests of proof.  
Paradoxically, as legal doctrine becomes more voluminous and more 
elaborate, it becomes less determinative of the outcomes produced by 
legal institutions.29 
That cases are decided based less on “facts that have weathered the 
testing of trial” has a number of consequences.  In the first place it pulls 
the actual decision in the case away from the reality of what has occurred 
and so undermines the rule of law.  Our actual lives will not be subject to 
the law, but rather to a relatively formulaic reconstruction of those lives.  
Judge Patricia Wald argued some time ago that the development of law, 
even at the appellate level, would be disfigured without the kind of full 
factual development that can occur only through the trial, and not 
through summary proceedings.  It is not a good thing that “[f]ederal 
                                                          
 29.  Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 29 (2006) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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jurisprudence is largely the product of summary judgment in civil 
cases.”30  Rather, it poses the danger that “the law developed through 
summary judgment will be arid, divorced from the full factual context 
that has in the past given our law life and the capacity to grow.”31 
Somewhat paradoxically, the trial is more likely to produce 
determinate “right answers” to cases than are other procedures that 
purport to be a more mechanical application of the “law of rules” by 
judges.  The latter allow for a broader range of judicial discretion than is 
exercised by the jury after trial—the point that Galanter made above.  
The notion here, of which it is very challenging to give anything 
approaching an adequate account,32 is that there really is a best way 
forward in most cases that can be reflected in a wise judgment in the 
individual matter.  That judgment requires a refined balancing of the 
competing considerations, which can never be homogenized into a single 
continuum that the judgment may fairly reflect.  Such balancing is not 
for all time or all situations, but only for the very particular facts of the 
individual case.  In reaching that judgment, a judge or a jury who has 
really been affected by the “consciously structured hybrid” of languages 
and practices will exercise very little discretion in the sense of an 
unrestrained freedom to do whatever he wants. 
It has been suggested that the American public order is becoming 
more bureaucratic, more imperial, and more byzantine.  Yes, American 
lawyers will continue at times to argue relatively refined issues of law to 
judges in the trial and appellate courts.  But it would be a shame if those 
in the legal profession became nothing more than adept practitioners of a 
technical legal discourse divorced from the real world of ordinary 
Americans and so of American juries.  We lawyers would be the poorer 
for it.  Much more importantly, the American legal order would too. 
James Boyd White has described the important question before us in 
the kind of language we use in the legal order: 
[T]here is always the question whether we shall find ways to insist 
upon our own freedom and responsibility in a world of constraint, to 
respect the humanity and reality of other people and their experience, 
and to contribute to the formation of a culture and a polity that will 
enhance human dignity—or whether we shall instead lead lives 
                                                          
 30.  Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (1998). 
 31.  Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: 
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 597, 625–26 (2004). 
 32.  I tried in a previous work.  See BURNS, supra note 18, at 220–44. 
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imprisoned in dead modes of thought and expression that deny the 
value of ourselves and other people, and the activities of life we 
share.”33 
White argues that American courts are under more “pressure than the rest 
of us to speak in dead, mechanical, or bureaucratic ways, and that they 
should resist these forces strenuously.34  The trial resists the obfuscation 
of specialized language and preserves a “strong truth-bearing everyday 
language, not marred or corrupted by technical discourse or scientific 
codes . . . of which we are in need as citizens, and as moral agents.”35  
Keeping the American trial from vanishing and continuing to educate 
American lawyers to speak in this forum for constrained democratic 
debate offers an important element of that resistance. 
 
                                                          
 33.  JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE, at xi (2006). 
 34.  Id. at 11. 
 35.  IRIS MURDOCH, METAPHYSICS AS A GUIDE TO MORALS 164 (1992). 
